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This article explores who has most skillfully used the rules of the global
economic regime — China, or the nations whose companies invest in her?
We first analyse China’s adoption and implementation of WTO
commitments in the automotive industry and the cultural goods sector. We
then consider the liberalisation of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI)
scheme and China’s use of FDI as a vehicle to acquire foreign technology,
while also restricting FDI to protect the domestic banking sector. Finally,
we analyse China’s engagement with the international financial regime,
particularly its exchange rate policy, and whether this too represents a
strategic implementation of reforms. Based on these four case studies, we
conclude that while the West initially dictated the terms of China’s
interaction with the global economic system, over time, China has deftly
engaged with global rules so as to promote its own national interests.
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INTRODUCTION
This project arose from the question of who had more adroitly
used the international trade, investment and financial regimes –
China or the nations whose companies invest in her?
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) has predicted that China’s economy may
well, on a purchasing power parity basis, become the largest in the
world by 2016.1 However, the particular question we were interested
in pursuing was not who has grown the most, or profited the most,
from investments made in China. The question was who has most
skillfully negotiated the rules governing China’s interaction with the
rest of the world, and then most skillfully implemented and applied
those rules?
To answer the question, this article analyzes the process of
China’s opening up to the world in two periods: its unilateral
opening-up from 1979 to 2001, and its later period of liberalization
occasioned by its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
in 2001. The article analyzes these issues in the three principal
sectors of the international economic legal order: trade, investment
1

THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), Balance of economic power will shift dramatically over the next 50 years, says
OECD,
Newsroom
(Nov.
9,
2012)
www.oecd.org/newsroom/balanceofeconomicpowerwillshiftdramaticallyoverthenext50yea
rssaysoecd.htm; OECD, Looking to 2060: Long-Term Global Growth Prospects, OECD
Economic
Policy
Paper
(Nov.
9,
2012).
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k8zxpjsggf0.pdf?expires=1383306469&id=id&accname
=guest&checksum=16E9C77FAEE9768FA31F7AE44DB78722.
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and finance. In doing so, the research conducts six case studies, two
in each sector. In trade, this article explores China’s strategic
implementation of its WTO obligations within the automotive
industry and the domestic cultural industry. In investment, this
article analyzes China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policies
on technology transfer and on its banking sector. Finally, in finance,
this article considers China’s reforms of its foreign exchange regime
and its observance of corresponding international obligations.

CHINA’S

WTO COMMITMENTS
REFORMS UNDER THE TRADE REGIME

AND

DOMESTIC

After a fifteen-year negotiating marathon, China finally became a
member of the WTO on 11 December 2001, a landmark event in the
history of the multilateral trading system. China’s accession was
significantly delayed by a confluence of events between 1989 and
1999,2 and by opposition to accession from domestic interest groups
and from governments in China and the West. 3 However, the
enormous potential benefits of accession for China and the world
always made China’s eventual WTO membership probable.
Both the United States and the European Commission – the key
parties who led the negotiations of China’s WTO admission –
believed that a true World Trade Organization must have China as a
member.4 They had high expectations that China’s WTO accession
2

The major events included the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991, the Uruguay Round negotiation from 1986 to 1994, and US
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. For reviews of China’s negotiation
process, see Jeffrey L., Gertler, China’s WTO Accession – the Final Countdown, in CHINA
AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 55-67 (Deborah Z.
Cass et al. eds., 2003); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY, 63–65 (2002).
3
See generally Yongzheng Yang, China’s WTO Accession: the Economics and Politics 34
J. WORLD TRADE 77 (2000). See also HUI FENG,THE POLITICS OF CHINA’S ACCESSION TO
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE DRAGON GOES GLOBAL 91–112 (2006) (discussing
conflicting interests within the Chinese leadership); Joseph Fewsmith, China and the
WTO: The Politics behind the Agreement 10 NAT’L BUREAU ASIAN RES. 23 (1999).
4
See Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th
Cong. 57 (1997) (statement of Carla A. Hills) (“It makes little sense to talk about a World
Trade Organization in which a country with 20 percent of the world’s population, having
an almost $1 trillion economy, and which is the world’s eleventh largest exporter, is not a
member.”); Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession: Commitments and Implications, 3 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 655 at 665 (2000) (“The European Union claims to be ‘a consistent and
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could bring significant economic benefits to their domestic
stakeholders. 5 Then United States Trade Representative (USTR)
Charlene Barshefsky stated:
By opening the Chinese economy to U.S. goods,
services and agricultural products, the WTO
accession . . . will create significant new
opportunities for American businesses, farmers and
working people. . . . [W]e have won commercially
meaningful and enforceable commitments that help
Americans on the farm and on the job export to
China by addressing the many layers of trade
barriers and policies which limit access; strengthen
guarantees of fair trade; and give us additional tools
for enforcement and compliance.6
Observers believed China’s accession would serve the United
States’s economic interests by providing U.S. firms with greatly
enhanced access to the world’s largest potential market in goods and
services.7 It was also generally believed that China’s entry would
allow the WTO’s wealthier nations to invoke the mechanism under
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) and compel China to protect intellectual
property rights (IPRs).
China’s decision to seek WTO entry was driven by a host of
factors, including enhanced market access to the 142 WTO
Members, equality of treatment in key markets such as the US,
including avoiding the humiliation of having to be the subject of an
annual vote to confer upon China most favored nation status, further
integration into the global economy and involvement in the
formulation of global trading rules, and development of trade
relationships with major trading partners. 8 However, it has been
vocal supporter of China’s entry into the WTO’. It ‘believes the WTO is not truly a
‘‘World’’ Trade Organization without China.’”).
5
See Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th
Cong. 43 (2000) (statement of Charlene Barshefsky).
6
Id. at 45–46.
7
See LARDY, supra note 2, at 163–164; QINGJIANG KONG, CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (2002).
8
WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22398, THE JACKSON-VANIK
AMENDMENT AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR WTO ACCESSION: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS., 2–
3 (2012); DILIP K. DAS, CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: ISSUES AND
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observed that the most important motivating factor was that WTO
obligations could provide Chinese leadership with a powerful lever
with which to facilitate and deepen the domestic economic and
industrial reforms which China had been undertaking since the
introduction of the “Reform and Open Door” policy by Deng
Xiaoping in 1978.9 Long Yongtu, then China’s Vice-Minister of
Trade and Chief WTO Negotiator, stated:
The fact that China’s accession to an international
organization would have such a wide impact
throughout the world is something we had not
expected at all. The important thing is that we in
China have successfully and skillfully handled the
domestic side of the accession process and have
transformed the pressure generated by these
negotiations, both at home and abroad, and turned
them into a promoter, a catalyst for China’s historic
process of economic reform and opening to the
outside world – a process started by Deng Xiaoping
23 years ago.10
Jeffrey Gertler, then Secretary to the Working Party on the
Accession of China, highlighted the benefits that China’s WTO
membership would bring to its own economic reforms in these
terms:
Accession should allow China to lock in the
accumulated benefits of the trade-reform process that
the Chinese government has undertaken to date, and
provide a platform from which China can sustain its
reform process into the future. By placing China’s
reforms within the broader context of trade
liberalization by all WTO members, Chinese
producers and exporters can increase the returns from
trade reform in China through reciprocal market
access abroad, and help the Chinese government
IMPLICATIONS,
DIGITAL
COLLECTIONS,
AVAILABLE
AT
HTTP://HDL.HANDLE.NET/1885/40255.
9
See LARDY, supra note 2, at 29–36 (discussing China’s unilateral reforms before WTO
accession).
10
See YONGTU LONG, Negotiating Entry: Key Lessons Learned, CHINA IN THE WTO: THE
BIRTH OF A NEW CATCHING-UP STRATEGY, 25, 26. (Carlos A. Magarinos et al. eds., 2002).
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resist pressure domestically to reverse the process of
reform.11
Thus, the belief that WTO accession would significantly
support China’s internal reforms was the principal reason for
China’s eagerness to gain WTO membership. With these
international obligations, the Chinese leadership secured substantial
political leverage in the pursuit of reforms necessary for the
continuous transition to a market economy, the transformation of
inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industries, the
establishment of a system of rule of law, and the enhancement of
transparency. These reforms were regarded as essential to enhancing
the efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs and historically highlyprotected industries, and to “achieve the goal of efficient allocation
of resources and an improved standard of living.”12 It was also
hoped that the development of a system of rule of law and
increasing transparency would serve to curtail rampant corruption,
and promote security and predictability of legal rights for both
domestic and foreign business operators.13
China made unparalleled commitments in order to join the WTO.
As Ambassador Barshefsky confirmed, the concessions China made
“far exceeded what anyone would have expected.”14 For example,
for goods, China committed to reduce its overall tariff level to 10%
by 2008, with the average tariff for industrial goods reduced to 9.1%
and for agricultural goods to 15.1%.15 Additionally, China agreed to
open up sensitive service sectors such as telecommunications,
banking, and insurance, and to grant essential rights to foreign firms,
such as trading rights and distribution rights. 16 The breadth and
depth of China’s market opening is unprecedented, far exceeding
11

Gertler, supra note 2, at 65.
Ligang Song, The State of the Chinese Economy – Structural Changes, Impacts and
Implications, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 83, 83–84 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003).
13
Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: to be and not to be – is that the answer, in
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 31, 35–36
(Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003).
14
Barshefsky, supra note 5, at 53; see also LARDY, supra note 2, at 65–105 (providing an
overview of China’s commitments).
15
GUANGSHENG SHI, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based on
Mutual Benefit, CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, at 15, 15 (Henry Gao & Donald
Lewis eds., 2005).
16
See LARDY, supra note 2, at 66; Aaditya Mattoo, China’s Accession to the WTO: The
Services Dimension, 6 J. INT’L ECON.L. 299, 300 (2003).
12
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the concessions made by other developing countries and even most
developed countries.17
Furthermore, since accession, China has had an outstanding
track record of implementing its commitments. To achieve
compliance with various rules of the WTO, China amended or
repealed “more than 3,000 laws and regulations at the central
government level and 190,000 at the local government level, the
largest-ever legislative revamp in history.”18 China “cut tariffs on
over 5,000 products” and reduced the overall tariff level to 9.8%.19
China granted market access to foreign services providers “even in
the most sensitive sectors, such as telecommunications and
insurance.”20 China also liberalized trading rights, which have long
been controlled by the government, allowing all entities, including
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and foreign individuals, to
import and export goods, except for a handful of special goods
subject to state trading.21
By admitting China to the WTO, the key players, especially the
United States and the European Union, secured enormous
commercial opportunities for their domestic stakeholders. 22
However, China has not delivered all the benefits the rich nations
wanted. Issues such as China’s enforcement of IPRs, restrictions on
trading rights in selected areas, and protection of sensitive goods
and services sectors have yet to be addressed to the satisfaction of
western countries and their domestic stakeholders.23 China’s non17

See LARDY, supra note 2, at 79; Mattoo, supra note 16, at 333 (observing that China’s
commitments in services are “the most radical services reform program negotiated in the
WTO”).
18
Xiaozhun Yi, A Decade in the WTO, A Decade of Shared Development, A DECADE IN
THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade
and Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 2011, at 1, 2 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz et al.
eds., 2011).
19
Zhenyu Sun, China’s Experience of 10 Years in the WTO, in A DECADE IN THE WTO:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and
Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 2011, at 11, 11 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz et al. eds.,
2011).
20
Id. at 12.
21
See infra pp. 14-20 (discussing China’s liberalization of trading rights).
22
See What Does China's WTO Accession Mean for Foreign Industry, U.S.-CHINA EXCH.
ASS’N, http://www.usachina.org/english/chinamarket/cmg17.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2012) (detailing a brief account of benefits derived from China’s accession for foreign
firms).
23
See U.S. TRADE REP., 2011 USTR REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE,
4–9 (2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3189.
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compliance with WTO rules in these specific areas has been caused
in part by various difficulties China encountered in implementing its
sweeping WTO commitments. 24 More significantly, however,
China’s non-compliance reflects a strategic approach to
implementation adopted so as to reap the full benefits of China’s
WTO membership in foreign markets while simultaneously
protecting the development of its key industries, and preserving its
national values, culture and identity so that its opening up would
serve its economic development. 25 Therefore, China has been
moving very slowly towards its committed levels of liberalization or
compliance in a range of specific areas, including bulk agricultural
goods, certain sensitive industrial goods and services sectors,
cultural goods, and enforcement of IPRs, to name a few.26 Below,
we discuss China’s strategic implementation of its WTO
commitments in the automotive industry and the cultural industry as
examples of this phenomenon.
Protection of the Automotive Industry
The automotive industry is one of the most sensitive industrial
sectors in China. On one hand, the development of this industry has
long been regarded as one of the key components and drivers of
China’s economic reform and development, but on the other hand,
this industry, which historically comprised groups of
underdeveloped manufacturing and assembly sectors, had long
remained vulnerable to foreign competition.27 Prior to China’s entry
into the WTO, the auto industry was heavily protected by high
tariffs, import quotas and other forms of non-tariff barriers.28 Upon
accession, China committed to reduce its import tariff on cars from
100% to 25%, and eliminate import quotas by 2005.29 Due to this
24

See, e.g., Angela Gregory, Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPs Agreement –
Confucius Meets the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE
NEW MILLENNIUM 321, 327–32 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the internal
impediments to China’s enforcement of intellectual property protection).
25
See Long, supra note 10, at 35.
26
See U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 23, at 23–112.
27
See Eric Harwit, The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China,
167 CHINA Q. 655 (2001) (discussing the development of China’s auto industry before its
WTO accession).
28
Id. See also FEDERATION OF AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATIONS, WHAT HAS WTO
MEMBERSHIP
BROUGHT
TO
CHINA'S
AUTO
INDUSTRY?,
available
at
http://www.fadaweb.com/wto.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2012).
29
See Harwit, supra note 27, at 663.
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massive dismantling of trade barriers, some feared that foreign auto
products would flood into China’s market, creating overwhelming
competition which Chinese auto producers would not be able to
withstand. Close observers, however, have concluded that the
impact of foreign competition on China’s auto industry has been
moderate.30
It seems that China adroitly committed to liberalize its trade
barriers to the point that it would still be able to sufficiently protect
its automotive industry, so that foreign competition would drive the
enhancement of efficiency and competitiveness of the industry
without crippling it. During its decade of integration into the global
trade regime, China’s auto industry has not only survived foreign
competition but has made tremendous strides in capacity, efficiency,
productivity, technological innovation, and development of local
brands to the point that China has become one of the world’s
leading auto producers.31
The support of the Chinese government has been
indispensable to this rise in China’s automotive industry. One of the
most important and widely recognized governmental supports has
been the provision of super-national treatment to foreign companies
investing in the automotive industry, which will be discussed later.
Another form of support has been China’s strategic implementation
of its WTO obligations on market access for foreign automobiles.
Although China overhauled its border measures (i.e. import tariffs
and quotas) in accordance with its WTO commitments, it introduced
various forms of internal measures to restrict the impact of foreign
competition in 2004 and 2005. One key measure was the Policy on
Development of Automotive Industry 32 issued by the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2004. Many
provisions of this Policy had the effect of limiting the volume of
imports, including limiting the number of ports of importation,
prohibiting storage of imported autos at these ports if the imports
are destined for domestic consumption, timing tariff collections so
as to adversely affect the cash position and liquidity of importers,
30

Id. at 665–669; LARDY, supra note 2, at 111–113.
See RACHEL TANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40924, THE RISE OF CHINA’S AUTO
INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE US MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 2–8 (Nov. 2009)
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40924.pdf.
32
Policy on Development of Automotive Industry, Order No. 8 (promulgated by the Nat’l
Dev. and Reform Comm’n (NDRC), effective May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Auto Policy].
31
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and restricting the number of distributors. 33 By enacting these
measures, the Chinese government evidenced a clear preference for
domestic automotive products over imports. Whether or not these
specific provisions comply with WTO rules has not been tested.
The Policy, together with several implementing rules adopted in
2005, stipulated that imported auto parts shall be treated as a
complete vehicle if they are used in the production/assembly of a
complete vehicle in China, and meet or exceed a specified quantity
or value threshold.34 As mentioned above, China committed to bind
its import tariffs on automobiles and auto parts at 25% and 10%
respectively. These measures, therefore, had the effect of artificially
inflating the import tariff on auto parts to the much higher level
applicable to automobiles. In 2006, the European Union, the United
States, and Canada challenged these Chinese measures, accusing
China of violating its WTO commitments by subjecting imported
auto parts to import tariffs in excess of its committed level.35 In 2008,
the WTO found against China and recommended it make these
measures consistent with its WTO commitments. On 31 August
2009, China reported to the WTO that it had taken the necessary
steps to remove the WTO-inconsistencies and comply with the
tribunal’s recommendations.36
The approach taken by the Chinese government to protect its
auto industry offers a perfect illustration of China’s strategic
implementation of its WTO commitments. While the WTO
obligations serve as a much-needed external force with which to
counteract domestic resistance to economic reforms, it is impossible
33

See Henry Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11
SINGAPORE Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (2007) (discussing the effects of the aforementioned
policy).
34
See Measures for the Administration of Import Automobile Components and Parts
Featuring Complete Vehicles, Decree No. 125, art. 21, 22 (promulgated by the General
Administration of Customs (GAC), the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the
MOFCOM, Feb. 28, 2005, effective Apr. 1, 2005); Rules on Verification of Imported
Automobile Parts Featuring Complete Vehicles, Announcement No. 4, art. 13, 14
(promulgated by the GAC, Mar. 28, 2005, effective Apr. 1, 2005)(LexisNexis)(China).
35
Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R,
WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R (Jan. 12, 2009); Appellate Body Report, WT/DS339/AB/R,
WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Jan. 12, 2009) (discussing the initial challenges and
then going on to consider the appellate arguments). See Raj Bhala & Won-Mog Choi,
China’s First Loss, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 321 (2011) (discussing this case).
36
Minutes of Meeting of 31 Aug. 31, 2009, WT/DSB/M/273. 21 (Nov. 6, 2009)(WTO
Dispute Settlement Body).
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to foresee accurately all of the impacts of these market-opening
obligations upon domestic industries. Therefore, when protection
became economically and politically important for the auto industry,
the Chinese government employed a strategic implementation
approach in order to secure a safe environment for the development
of this industry at the cost of foreign auto producers; and in defiance
of its WTO commitments. Although the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism corrected China’s opportunistic approach, it took two
years for western countries to become aware of China’s measures
and another three years to eventually secure China’s compliance.
During those five years, those internal measures that were not tested
under the WTO continued to constitute obstacles to the importation
of foreign autos, and hence protected a “healthy” competitive
environment for domestic automotive producers. Furthermore, even
though the Chinese government has amended or abolished those
measures found to be WTO-illegal, it is likely that other forms of
protectionist measures will be readily and easily introduced if and
when necessary.
Restriction on Trading Rights for Cultural Goods
For decades, trading rights – the right to import and export –
were strictly controlled by the Chinese government. At the time of
the launch of domestic reform in 1978, trading rights were
dominated by 12 SOEs who were authorized to import and export
all goods.37 The reform led to substantial liberalization of trading
rights. Prior to WTO accession, the Chinese government had
authorized 35,000 firms of all types to engage in foreign trade.38
However, significant restrictions on trading rights still remained:
China had an “examination and approval” system under which, in
order to become a “foreign trade operator” (FTO) entitled to trading
rights, applicants had to satisfy a number of criteria set forth in the
then applicable Foreign Trade Law (1994)39 and the implementing
regulations. These criteria mainly included threshold requirements
for registered capital, export performance and prior experience, as

37

See LARDY, supra note 2, at 40.
Id. at 41–42.
39
Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 8, 9 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 12, 1994, effective Jul. 1, 1994, revised Apr. 6,
2004, revision effective Jul. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Foreign Trade Law].
38
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well as limitations on the scope of imports and exports. 40
Accordingly, the grant of trading rights was not automatic but was
subject to the above-mentioned restrictions and the approval of the
government. This “examination and approval” system for the grant
of trading rights constituted a non-tariff barrier, with the effect of
limiting the number and types of enterprises that could engage in
importation, and consequently restricting the volume of imports.41
In order to join the WTO, China agreed to gradually
liberalize trading rights within three years, so that after 11
December 2004 there were to be no restrictions on who would be
entitled to import and export goods, except for those goods for
which China has retained the right of state trading.42 To implement
this commitment China amended the 1994 Foreign Trade Law in
July 2004. The revised Foreign Trade Law (2004) replaced the
“examination and approval” system with a “registration” system
under which all entities, domestic and foreign alike, were
automatically granted trading rights upon registration.43 Registration
was not dependent upon the satisfaction of the substantive criteria
historically applicable under the “examination and approval” system
but merely required the lodgment of documents containing basic
information about the applicants such as business license and
organization code. 44 Goods explicitly exempted from China’s
commitment on trading rights are still subject to state trading.45
However, for all other goods, it has been observed that the
introduction of the registration system marks “a full liberalization of
China’s general foreign trading rights regime as a WTO accession
commitment.”46
40

XIN ZHANG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION IN CHINA: LAW AND POLICY 26–32
(2006).
41
Id., at 23–24.
42
WTO Accession Working Party, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China,
¶¶83(d) & 84(a), WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001); Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China art. 5.1, Nov. 23, 2001, WT/L/432. (These exceptions, set out
in Annex 2A of China’s Accession Protocol, include the importation of grain, vegetable oil,
sugar, tobacco, crude oil, processed oil, chemical fertilizer, and cotton, and the exportation
of tea, rice, corn, soy bean, tungsten ore and certain tungsten products, coal, crude oil,
processed oil, silk, cotton, cotton yarn, certain woven cotton products, antimony, and
silver).
43
Foreign Trade Law, supra note 39, at arts. 3, 4.
44
Id., art. 5.3.
45
ZHANG, supra note 40, at 41–44.
46
Id., at 31.
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This observation is generally correct, except that for years
following WTO accession, the Chinese government, through a web
of administrative regulations and departmental rules, maintained the
“examination and approval” system and state trading in relation to
the importation of some cultural goods including reading materials
(i.e. books, newspapers, magazines, and electronic publications),47
audio-visual products (i.e. videocassettes, video compact discs, and
DVDs),48 and films for theatrical release.49 Although these goods are
not contained in the list of goods exempted from China’s general
commitment on trading rights, China confined the right to import
these goods to approved or designated SOEs only. In 2007, the
United States initiated a WTO proceeding – the China Publications and Audio-Visual Products case,50 challenging Chinese
measures restricting the right to import these cultural goods on the
ground that FIEs, foreign enterprises and individuals had been
deprived of trading rights which should have been granted
according to China’s WTO commitments. In 2009, the WTO
tribunals found in favor of the United States, ruling that China had
breached its commitments on trading rights and urging China to
bring the measures at issue into compliance with its commitments.
Since then, China has taken steps to remedy its WTO violations. On
12 March 2012, China reported to the WTO DSB that by amending
or abolishing the relevant measures it has achieved consistency with
its commitments. 51 However, given the economic and political

47

Chubanwu Guanli Tiaoli (出版物管理条例) [Regulations on the Management of
Publications] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002)
(Westlaw China) at arts. 41, 42 (China).
48
Yinxiang Zhipin Jinkou Guanli Banfa (音 像 制 品 进 口 管 理 办 法 ) [Rules for the
Management of the Import of Audiovisual Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Culture and the Gen. Admin. of Customs, Apr. 17, 2002, effective June 1, 2002)
(LexisNexis) at arts. 7, 8 (China).
49
Dianying Guanli Tiaoli (电影管理条例) [Regulations on the Management of Films]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002) (LexisNexis) at
arts. 5, 30(China).
50
Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (Jan. 19,
2010); Appellate Body Report, WT/DS363/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2010). See also Tania Voon,
China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 710 (2009)
(providing an overview of this case).
51
Status Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights And Distribution Services For
Certain Publications And Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/17/Add. 14
(Mar. 13, 2012).
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significance of these cultural sectors in China, it is still too early to
ascertain whether China has liberalized the trading rights in practice.
It can be argued that the Chinese government has deliberately
chosen not to liberalize the right to import these special goods
regardless of the likely violations of its WTO obligations and is
undertaking a strategic implementation of its WTO commitments.
China’s non-compliance with commitments in this selected area
suggests, at least, two policy considerations.
First, it reflects the policy inclination of the Chinese
government to maintain the protection of its domestic cultural
industry from foreign competition. The Chinese government has
treated the reform and development of the cultural industry as being
one of its policy priorities and accordingly has devoted a great
amount of resources to achieving that goal.52 Although this industry
has been reformed in recent years, it faces a range of problems and
remains underdeveloped and considerably less competitive than that
of developed countries.53 Therefore, although ambitiously promoting
reforms and development of the industry, the Chinese government
has believed that a transitional period is essential to allow the
industry to gain efficiency and competitiveness in the global cultural
market.54 One traditional way of affording protection to this industry
is to confine the right to import cultural goods to a very limited
number of SOEs designated by the General Administration of Press
and Publications (GAPP) for reading materials and by the State
Administration on Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) for films.
Quantities of imports have thereby been strictly controlled so as to
prevent the industrial reform and development being frustrated by a
flood of highly competitive foreign cultural imports. As pointed out
52

See Xiaolu Chen, China’s Cultural Industries in the Face of Trade Liberalization: An
Analytical Framework of China’s Cultural Policy 68–86 (2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
The
Ohio
State
University)
available
at
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap:10:0::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:69733 (follow “View” or
“Download” hyperlinks) (discussing comprehensively the evolution of China’s policies on
cultural development and reforms). See generally Xiang Yong & Yu Wenyi, Chinese
Cultural Industries: Targets, Gross Volume, Structure, Problems and Strategy, 19 INT’L J.
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 152 (2011).
53
See WTO & Chinese Culture: Rising WTO Challenges to Culture Industry,
CHINACULTURE.ORG,
http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_focus/200309/25/content_43085.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
54
See Chen, supra note 52, at 48–67 (discussing a “cultural exception and cultural
ambition” approach adopted by the Chinese government in fostering development of its
cultural industry).
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by Long Yongtu, China had aimed to ensure its WTO commitments
reflect “the level of maturity reached in each and every sector under
negotiation” so that “these arrangements will not jeopardize the
development of these industries.”55 Apparently, while the Chinese
government did not manage to negotiate an exception to the general
obligation to liberalize trading rights for its sensitive cultural sectors,
it strategically ignored its WTO commitments in these sectors.
Second, apart from the economic considerations discussed above,
China’s strategic implementation reflects a mix of cultural and
political considerations of the specific nature of cultural goods that
carry the content of social values and political orientation. Each
society has unique values, but China considers its cultural heritage
to be particularly rich and exceptional, and has put a high priority on
preserving its national values, culture, and identity. Thus, while
supporting China’s bid for the WTO membership, then Chinese
President Jiang Zemin stressed that:
[A] few countries . . . have tried to force their own
values, economic regime, and social system on other
countries by taking advantage of economic
globalization . . . we must take it as a crucial task in
our cultural development to carry forward and
cultivate the national spirit and incorporate it into our
national education and the entire process of building
spiritual civilization . . . 56
Furthermore, cultural goods “serve as essential instruments in
disseminating government policy and shaping public opinion.” 57
China’s imposition of the limitations on the right to import cultural
goods has therefore been considered important to (1) “combat
perceived cultural colonialism” by western countries, especially the
US, and (2) “regulate the cultural content its population
consumes.”58 Accordingly, in the China - Publications and Audio55

Long, supra note 10, at 32.
Chen, supra note 52, at 58–59 citing Jiang Zemin speech at Grand Gathering Marking
the Eightieth Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, PEOPLE’S DAILY, July 2, 2001,
at 3-4.
57
Jingxia Shi & Weidong Chen, The ‘Specificity’ of Cultural Products versus the
‘Generality’ of Trade Obligations: Reflecting on ‘China – Publications and Audiovisual
Products,’ 45 J. WORLD TRADE 159, 161 (2011).
58
Elanor A. Mangin, Market Access in China – Publications and Audiovisual Materials: A
Moral Victory with A Silver Lining, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 279, 302–303 (2010).
56
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Visual Products litigation, China argued vigorously that the trading
rights limitations in these cultural sectors have played an essential
role in protecting public morals by ensuring that the content of
imports is reviewed by competent import entities and does not
contravene the social norms and values in China.59 Although China
lost the argument that restricting trading rights is a WTO-consistent
way of protecting public morals, its prerogative to regulate the
content of cultural imports was not questioned by the WTO
tribunals. Therefore, China will almost certainly maintain
censorship through other measures untested under the WTO, which
may well constitute new forms of strategic implementation in the
cultural industry.
In short, in restricting trading rights in the cultural sectors, the
Chinese government restricts not only the quantity, but also the
quality, of imports. Based on a mix of economic, political, social
and cultural considerations, China has chosen to conduct a strategic
implementation of its obligations whereby it denies market access to
foreign cultural goods for the purpose of the reform and
development of its own cultural industry.

CHINA’S WTO COMMITMENTS
REFORMS UNDER THE INVESTMENT REGIME

AND

DOMESTIC

Another pillar of China’s economic reform has been the
liberalization of its foreign investment regime. As a result of the
liberalization, China has received steadily increasing foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflows,60 and in the first half of 2012 it surpassed
the United States to become the largest recipient of FDI
worldwide. 61 Many factors have underpinned the FDI boom in
China, such as China’s market potential and cheap labor, but
perhaps the most influential factor has been China’s opening up to,
59

See China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, supra note 50, ¶ 7.713.
60
Xinkui Wang, WTO Accession: A Historical Opportunity for China’s Reform and
Opening, in A DECADE IN THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE
GOVERNANCE 61 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz et al. eds., 2011) (detailing the rise of export
oriented FDI in China since 1986).
61
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Global Investment Trends
Monitor, No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/2 (Oct. 23, 2012).
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and especially its provision for preferential treatment of, foreign
investment. 62 The liberalization process can be divided into two
major stages – the first being China’s unilateral opening up to
foreign investment before joining the WTO and the second being
China’s opening up according to its WTO obligations. We begin
with an overview of the two stages of liberalization, followed by a
discussion of how China has gained enormously from the
liberalization of its investment regime and by aligning its policies
and laws governing foreign investment tightly with its national
development goals.
The launch of the “reform and open door” policy was a
watershed in the history of China’s foreign investment regime.63 In
July 1979, the Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures64 (SFEJV Law) was enacted to allow foreign investors to
establish equity joint ventures (JVs) with Chinese enterprises.
Besides laying down the basic legal framework for FDI, the Law
specified some tax incentives for foreign investors and for JVs with
leading technology.65 Subsequently, in 1986 and 1988 respectively,
the Law of the PRC on Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises66 (FWOE
Law) and the Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Contractual
Cooperative Enterprises 67 (SFCCE Law) were enacted to allow
other forms of foreign investment. Several implementing
regulations68 were also put into effect to provide greater details on
62

See Wanda Tseng & Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons
for Other Countries, IMF POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER, Feb. 2002, at 8–19. (showing the
three primary factors that have influenced FDI growth in China).
63
See Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 11–17; K.C. Fung et al., Foreign Direct
Investment in China: Policy, Recent Trend and Impact 33 GLOBAL ECON. REV. 99, 99–105
(2004)(Apart from the references to specific Chinese laws and regulations, the following
description is based on these two sources)
64
Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., effective July 8, 1979; amended by the Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Apr.
4, 1990; amended by the Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Mar. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
SFEJV Law].
65
See SFEJV Law (1979), supra note 64, at art. 8.
66
Law of the PRC on Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., effective Apr. 12, 1986; amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., effective Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter FWOE Law].
67
Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Contractual Cooperative Enterprises (promulgated by
the Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Apr. 13, 1988; amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., effective Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter SFCCE Law].
68
Regulations for the Implementation of Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures, Decree No. 311 (promulgated by the St. Council on Sep 20, 1983; amended by
the St. Council on Jan. 15, 1986, then on Dec. 21, 1987, and most recently on July 22,
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the formation and operation of these enterprises and implement
other policies in favor of FDI. These policies involved an array of
tax and non-tax incentives in designated regions of China, starting
with five pilot Special Economic Zones (SEZ)69 and fourteen Open
Coastal Cities (OCC)70 and then expanding to other areas nationwide.
The special tax incentives mainly consisted of income tax
exemptions and reductions for a specified period of time,
“exemptions of customs duties and the value-added tax for imported
equipment and technology . . . full refunds for income tax paid on
reinvested earnings, and no restrictions on profit remittances and
capital repatriation.”71 Other non-tax incentives mainly pertained to
the relaxation of government controls on the movements of goods,
export and import, and the use of land, water and other resources
and infrastructure. In order to regulate the direction of FDI, the
Chinese government issued rules in 1995, classifying FDI projects
into four categories: Encouraged, Permitted, Restricted, and
Prohibited. 72 While various restrictions were placed on foreign
investment in the “restricted” and “prohibited” sectors (such as
upper limits on foreign ownership shares and sectorial restrictions
on foreign investment), particularly favorable tax and non-tax
incentives were accorded to foreign investment in the “encouraged”
sectors, especially to export-oriented FIEs and those employing new
2001, effective July 22, 2001) [hereinafter SFEJV Regulation]; Regulations for the
Implementation of Law of the PRC on Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises, Decree No.
301 (approved by the St. Council on Oct. 28, 1990; revised on Apr. 12, 2001, effective Apr.
12, 2001) [hereinafter FWOE Regulation]; Regulations for the Implementation of Law of
the PRC on Sino-Foreign Contractual Cooperative Enterprises (approved by the State
Council and promulgated by the MOFTEC on Aug. 7, 1995, effective Aug. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter SFCCE Regulation].
69
The 5 SEZs include Shenzhen, Shantou and Zhuhai in Guangdong province, Xiamen in
Fujian province and Hainan province.
70
The 14 OCCs are Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang,
Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai City.
71
Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 15.
72
The Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Projects was approved by the
State Council on 7 June 1995, effective 20 June 1995. This interim rule was replaced by
the Regulations Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment, Decree No. 346
(promulgated by the State Council Feb. 11, 2002, effective Apr. 1, 2002). Catalogue of
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (Catalogue), order No. 5 (promulgated by the
State Planning Commission (SPC), State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and
the MOFTEC, effective on June 20, 1995). This Catalogue has been revised several times
in 1997 (by Order No. 9 of the SPC, the SETC and the MOFTEC), in 2002 (by Order No.
21 of the SPC, the SETC and the MOFTEC), in 2004 (by Order No. 24 of the NDRC and
the MOFCOM), in 2007 (by Order No. 57 of the NDRC and the MOFCOM), and lately in
2011 (by Order No. 12 of the NDRC and the MOFCOM).
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and advanced technology. These policies and laws encouraging
technology FIEs will be discussed further below. Furthermore, the
Chinese government imposed many restrictions on FIEs in general,
most notably local content requirements under which FIEs were
required to purchase raw materials and components from domestic
suppliers, and export performance and foreign exchange balancing
requirements under which the amount of imports allowed by FIEs
was conditioned upon their volume of exports and amount of
foreign exchange earnings respectively.73
In order to join the WTO, China further liberalized its foreign
investment regime in a number of ways.74 First, China revised the
Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (Catalogue),
increasing the number of “encouraged” sectors for foreign
investment from 186 to 262, and decreasing the number of
“restricted” sectors from 112 to 75. Second, the restrictions on
foreign equity were relaxed and the performance requirements,
including local content, export performance and foreign exchange
balancing, were removed pursuant to the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). Third, under its
specific commitments attached to the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS), China pledged to gradually open up its
sensitive service sectors to foreign participation, such as
telecommunications, banking, and distribution. China’s FDI policies
in the banking sector will be further discussed below.
China’s liberalization of its foreign investment regime has
provided great commercial opportunities for foreign investors. 75
Having benefited from China’s unilateral opening-up, rich countries
had high expectations that bringing China into the WTO would
bring considerably more opportunities for their companies. In large
measure, these expectations have been fulfilled.
73

See, e.g., SFEJV Law (1990), supra note 64, at art. 9; SFEJV Regulation (1987), supra
note 68, at arts. 4(3), 14(7), 57 & 75; FWOE Law (1986), supra note 66, at arts. 3, 15 & 18;
FWOE Regulation (1990), supra note 68, at arts. 3(2), 15, 45 & 46.
74
See generally Julia Ya Qin, Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO
Accession on China’s Legal System, 191 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 720, 728–733 (2007)
(China’s WTO accession liberalized China’s economy, resulting in huge growth in trade
and investment); Fung et al., supra note 63, at 104–105.
75
See generally U.N.CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012:
TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES, U.N. Sales No. E.12.ll.D.3 (2012)
(estimating that China is likely to be the most attractive destination for FDI in the
following three years until 2014).
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However, it is submitted that China’s gains eclipse those of its
foreign investors. China has continuously liberalized its market for
foreign investment, and yet has regulated FDI in such a way as to
ensure that it contributes to China’s economic reform and
development without retarding the growth of its underdeveloped
industries.76 For decades, foreign investment has been an essential
driving force for China’s economic growth and transformation.
Specifically, FDI has made tremendous contributions to the
economic development of China by expanding the export of
manufacturing goods, imparting new and advanced technology and
management skills, enhancing industrial productivity and the
competitiveness of Chinese goods and services, raising capital
formation and accumulation, creating job opportunities, generating
tax revenue, stimulating China’s transition to a market-oriented
economy and raising the living standards of its people. 77 The
investment policies and laws adopted and implemented by the
Chinese government in both stages of the liberalization – the
unilateral opening-up stage and the WTO-mandated opening-up
stage – have played an essential role in helping China to achieve
such great success. Two typical examples will be discussed below:
China’s encouragement of high-tech FIEs, and its selected
liberalization of its banking sector.
China’s FDI Policy on Technology Transfer
Since the commencement of its reform, the Chinese
government anticipated that FDI “would introduce new technologies,
know-how and capital”,78 and committed itself to promoting FDI
that facilitates transfer of technology to local firms. As established
empirically, the diffusion of new and advanced technology,
76

See David A. Eberle, FDI in China: Economic Growth and Policy 5–6 (EE469 Seminar
in
Dev.
Econ.,
Working
Paper),
available
at
http://www.davideberle.com/files/university/SeminarDevelopmentEconomics%20FDIChin
a.pdf (arguing that most of these negative impacts associated with FDI boom, as many
observers have predicted, have been wisely managed by the Chinese government to ensure
that those impacts will not affect the reform and development of domestic industries).
77
See Kevin H. Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in China: A
Panel
Data
Study
for
1992-2004
(June
25,
2006),
at
4-5,
http://www.karyiuwong.com/confer/beijing06/papers/zhang.pdf; Long, supra note 10, at
28–34; Fung et al., supra note 63, at 117–123; Lee G. Branstetter & Nicholas Lardy,
China’s Embrace of Globalization 17–20 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Dep’t. of Soc. and
Decision Sciences, Working Paper No. 49, 2006).
78
Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 11.
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expertise and knowledge has been one of the most significant
benefits that FDI has generated for China’s economic growth.79 The
productivity and technological capability of China’s industries have
improved dramatically, at a pace much faster than many other
developing countries.80
The Chinese government’s strategy to use FDI as a vehicle
for foreign technology transfer has been indispensable for the
extraordinary technological development of China. In almost all
FDI-related laws and regulations, foreign investment that led to the
introduction of new and advanced technologies has been warmly
welcomed and consistently promoted through a variety of
preferential treatments. In each version of the SFEJV Law, the
FWOE Law and the SFCCE Law as well as their corresponding
implementing regulations, the use of new and advanced
technologies was one of the most important requirements imposed
on FIEs.81 Under each version of the Catalogue, foreign investment
that fostered technological advancement and innovation in various
sectors was consistently classified as ‘encouraged’. More
specifically, as mentioned above, technologically-advanced FIEs
were eligible for income tax exemptions and reductions on more
favorable terms than those applied generally to most of the other
FIEs.
During the initial stage of opening-up in the 1980s, while all FIEs
were entitled to income tax holidays for the first two years and fifty
percent tax reduction in the following three years, technology FIEs
were granted an extension of the fifty percent tax reduction for
another three years.82 In SEZs, the income tax rate applicable to
technology FIEs (i.e. ten percent) was lower than that on most other
FIEs (i.e. fifteen percent).83 Likewise, since the 1990s, the FIEs
established in designated zones that contributed to technological
79

See Zhiqiang Liu, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Spillover: Evidence from
China, 30 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 579 (2002); Xinglong Xie & Hongqi Wang, On Effects
of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth, 2 INT’L BUS. RESEARCH 100 (2009).
80
INNOVATION AND GROWTH: CHASING A MOVING FRONTIER 41–43 (Vandana Chandra et al.
eds., 2009).
81
See e.g., SFEJV Law (1979, 2001), supra note 64, at art. 5; SFEJV Regulations (1983),
supra note 68, at art. 4(1); SFEJV Regulations (2001), supra note 68, at art. 3; FWOE Law
(1986, 2000), supra note 66, at art. 3; FWOE Regulations (1990, 2001), supra note 68, at
art. 3; SFCCE Law (2000), supra note 67, at art. 4.
82
Tseng & Zebregs, supra note 62, at 15.
83
Id.
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progress enjoyed much lower income tax rates (i.e. fifteen percent
versus thirty-three percent), additional periods of tax exemption and
reduction, and a full tax refund upon direct reinvestment, amongst
other benefits not received by other FIEs.84 Moreover, as foreign
investment in the form of JVs began to be regarded as a better
vehicle for the transfer of technology to domestic firms,85 equity JVs
began to be granted more favorable tax treatment than foreign
wholly owned enterprises.86
In the auto industry, Sino-foreign JVs were the only permitted
form of FDI primarily because these could most effectively help
domestic firms acquire foreign technology. 87 To ensure such
acquisitions of technology, the establishment of auto JVs was
conditioned upon foreign investors transferring technology to their
Chinese partners.88 In the meantime, FDI in the auto sector was
encouraged not only by these tax incentives but also by other
financial incentives (such as preferential access to bank credit and
loans).89
In 2007, China enacted the Enterprise Income Tax Law90 (EIT
Law), which came into effect on 1 January 2008. This law, which
was formulated partly in response to growing domestic opposition
to the super-national treatment of FIEs, considerably reduced these
FDI-related tax incentives and unified the tax rates and policies for
FIEs and domestic enterprises.91 While a twenty-five percent income
tax is now being applied across the board, tax incentives for
technology progress have been reinforced rather than reduced. For
84

Qun Li, Tax Incentive Policies for Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China and their
Influence on Foreign Investment, 18 REVENUE L. J., 2008, at 1, 8-13.
85
Sanjaya Lall & Manuel Albaladejo, The Competitive Impact of China on Manufactured
Exports by Emerging Economies in Asia, CHINA IN THE WTO: THE BIRTH OF A NEW
CATCHING-UP STRATEGY 76, 101–102 (Carlos A. Magarinos et al. eds., 2002).
86
See Li, supra note 84, at 4.
87
See GREGORY T. CHIN, CHINA’S AUTOMOTIVE MODERNIZATION: THE PARTY-STATE AND
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 114–115 (Palgrave Macmillan 2010).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 112.
90
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui (中华⼈人民共和国企业所得税法)
[Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16,
2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) 63 Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China.
[hereinafter EIT Law]. (This law is implemented by Regulations for the Implementation of
Enterprise Income Tax Law of the PRC, Decree No. 512 (promulgated by the State
Council on Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) [hereinafter EIT Regulations].)
91
See supra note 84, at 24–36.
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instance, income earned from technology transfers is eligible for a
fifty percent tax reduction or tax exemption.92 Enterprises with “high
and new technology” enjoy a reduced tax rate of fifteen percent
provided they satisfy certain specified criteria including, inter alia,
ownership of core IPRs and sufficient devotion to technological
development.93 Enterprises investing in unlisted medium and small
high-technology enterprises are entitled to tax deductions for
seventy percent of their total investment.94 The continuing provision
of preferential tax treatment for technology enterprises is a corollary
of the policy direction of FDI towards technological development.
Both the eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-2010) and the twelfth Five
Year Plan (2011-2015) have strengthened the role of technological
innovation and advancement in bolstering further economic growth
and reform in China.95 With respect to foreign investment, the focus
has been shifted from the quantity of FDI to the quality of FDI, with
a particular emphasis on encouraging and directing foreign
investment in high-tech industries. Therefore, it is hardly surprising
that the Chinese government has maintained the preferential
treatment of technology FIEs while leveling the playing field for
domestic and foreign-invested enterprises in most other areas.
Before China’s entry into WTO, its foreign investment
policies mandating technology transfer aroused considerable
concerns among foreign investors and their governments. Upon
WTO accession, China committed not to condition the approval of
foreign investment upon “the transfer of technology . . . or the
conduct of research and development in China.”96 However, it has
been noted that many Chinese laws and regulations remain geared
toward encouraging technology transfer and research and
development (R&D) by FIEs.97 For example, Several Opinions on
92

See EIT Law, supra note 90, art. 27(4); EIT Regulations, supra note 90, art. 90.
See supra note 90, art. 28(2); EIT Regulations, supra note 90, art. 93.
94
EIT Law, supra note 90, art. 31; EIT Regulations, supra note 90, art. 97.
95
THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC, OUTLINE OF THE 11TH FIVE-YEAR
PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm; OUTLINE OF THE 12TH FIVE-YEAR
PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.
96
See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 42, art. 7.3.
97
See United States Trade Representative, supra note 23, at 68; Amanda McBratney, PostWTO China: Competition and Technology Transfer Laws in the ‘New’ Socialist Market
Economy, 12 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 1 (2004) (reviewing Chinese laws relevant to technology
transfer).
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Further Improving the Work of Utilizing Foreign Investment
explicitly directs FDI into high-tech industries and FIEs to engage
in R&D activities.98 Even in areas where such policy direction is
absent, technology transfer has still been treated as necessary for
FDI approvals in practice by some Chinese authorities.99
Although the WTO-consistency of these laws and practice has
not been tested, they appear incompatible with China’s obligations
to remove these requirements relating to technology transfer and
R&D in approving FDI. However, given China’s long-standing and
consistent commitment to economic reform and development
through technological advancement and innovation, it is reasonable
to believe that China will continue to flout its obligations under the
WTO and utilize FDI to advance the technological progress of
domestic industries. Undertakings relating to technology transfer
and development, in one way or another, are likely to remain the
price foreign investors will have to pay for market access.
Finally, as mentioned before, the developed world widely
expected that China’s WTO admission, with its obligations under
TRIPs, would lead to China’s enforcement of IPRs in favor of
foreign investors. However, from China’s perspective, the primary
motivation for undertaking the TRIPs obligations was that IPR
protection is indispensible for attracting high-tech FDI and fostering
indigenous technological innovation. As Long Yongtu stated,
China has to create a favourable environment at home
to provide enough incentives for its own people to
advance scientific and technology innovation, which
is crucial to China’s future status in international
competition. The conclusion is that the protection of
IPRs is not a favour for the foreigners; it is in the
fundamental interest of China itself.
In this connection, protection of IPRs has become a
precondition for China to attract more FDI, especially
in the high-tech area, as the preferential treatment
98

Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyuby Zuo Hao Liyong Waizi GongZuo de RuoGan Yijian (国
院关于 一步做好利用外 工作的若干意 ) [Several Opinions of the State Council on
Further Utilizing Foreign Capital] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 6, 2010, effective
Apr. 13, 2010).
99
See United States Trade Representative, supra note 23, at 68.
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provided in taxation and other incentives is not
sufficient to maintain China’s appeal to foreign
investors.100
In summary, as with the liberalization of its foreign trade regime,
China’s liberalization of its foreign investment regime has served its
own national interest. While ambitiously promoting foreign
investment, China adhered to its development goals and
endeavoured to regulate FDI in ways that contribute to its economic
growth and reform. China strategically ‘implemented’ its
international obligations to utilize high-tech FDI to develop the
technological capacity of its domestic industries. When WTO
obligations stood in the way of China’s accomplishment of its
policy goals (such as technological development through high-tech
FDI), China deliberately ignored those obligations in pursuit of its
domestic interests at the expense of foreign investors. This point can
also be demonstrated by a brief discussion of China’s liberalization
of its banking sector for foreign investment.
China’s FDI Policies in the Banking Sector
Before WTO accession, and despite its general policy of
attracting FDI, China maintained severe restrictions on foreign
investment in a number of highly sensitive services sectors such as
telecommunications, financial services and distribution services.101
In admitting China into the WTO, western countries managed to
have China commit to gradually open up these sectors to foreign
participation. 102 However, China’s implementation of these WTO
commitments has progressed significantly more slowly than in other
areas, generating considerable concern.
One of the most protected and slow-developing services sectors
in China has been the banking industry. During the period of
unilateral liberalization, banking services were dominated by four
state-owned commercial banks – namely Bank of China (BOC),
China Construction Bank, China Agricultural Bank and China
Industrial and Commercial Bank – and the sector was almost
100
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101
See generally LARDY, supra note 2, at 66–73.
102
See generally Mattoo, supra note 16.

26

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW Vol. 9

entirely closed to foreign banks.103 Foreign investment was subject
to geographical restrictions, limited scope of business, and other
entry barriers. In general, foreign banks were only allowed to
provide foreign currency banking services. Although an increasing
number of foreign banks were permitted to conduct RMB currency
business from 1997, they were allowed to do so only in Pudong and
Shenzhen and only to FIEs located in these two regions.104 The
capacity of foreign banks to conduct RMB business was further
restricted by limitations on their access to domestic currency,
including domestic currency deposit ceilings and conditions that
tied domestic currency deposits to foreign currency deposits.105
Upon WTO accession, China pledged to progressively
liberalize its banking sector for foreign suppliers by phasing out the
above-mentioned restrictions by December 2006.106 As specified in
its GATS Schedule, China’s major commitments relating to foreign
investment in the banking sector include:
allowing FDI in the banking sector by either establishing
wholly foreign-owned banks or permitting investment in
Chinese banks without placing limitations on foreign ownership
or forms of foreign investment;
gradually relaxing and eventually removing the limitations on
the location, client groups and scope of business of foreign
banks, such that upon the expiration of the phase-out period,
foreign banks will be allowed to engage in domestic currency
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business in all regions and to all Chinese clients;107
other than prudential measures, lifting all existing restrictions
on the “ownership, operation, and juridical form of foreign
financial institutions”; and
according national treatment to foreign banks so that they are
entitled to terms or conditions at least as favorable as those
applied to domestic banks.108
China’s commitments to opening up the banking sector are more
thorough and comprehensive than any those made by other WTO
Members. However, China’s progress and overall implementation
of these commitments have considerably lagged behind the
expectations of foreign governments and investors, and indeed
behind what the Chinese government has regularly asserted.
Certainly, as in other sectors, the Chinese government has long
planned to undertake reforms of its banking sector so as to enhance
its efficiency and competitiveness. However, the particular
sensitivity of the banking sector coupled with the long-standing
state dominance of banking has significantly impeded the reform
process. Thus, even though the Chinese government has realized
that its banking system has constituted one of the largest
impediments to China’s further economic growth109, the political
will has been inadequate to accelerate the pace of reforms.
Consequently, despite the growing presence of foreign banks and
branches of foreign banks in the Chinese market after China’s WTO
accession, they have failed to gain more than a marginal share in
China’s banking system.110
The limited foreign penetration into China’s banking sector has
much to do with the Chinese government’s measures governing FDI
in this sector. For instance, in December 2003, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) promulgated the Administrative
Rules Governing the Equity Investment in Chinese Financial
Institutions by Overseas Financial Institutions, which confines the
107
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equity share of a single foreign investor in a Chinese bank to 20%
and the total equity share of foreign investors to 25%. 111 This
requirement, which restricts foreign ownership in Sino-foreign joint
banks, is arguably in conflict with China’s GATS commitments as
listed above.112 In November 2006, the State Council issued the
Regulations for the Administration of Foreign-Funded Banks, 113
which was implemented by the CBRC’s Rules for the
Implementation of the Regulations for the Administration of
Foreign-Funded Banks.114 Amongst other conditions, these measures
stipulate that foreign banks’ branches can only take RMB deposits
of one million or more from Chinese citizens, and that in order to
conduct RMB business, these branches must have a working capital
of RMB 100 million.115 These conditions, which are not specified in
China’s GATS schedule, have effectively restricted the capacity of
foreign bank branches to engage in RMB business, and therefore
may also constitute a violation of China’s WTO obligations.116
Finally, in a recent WTO case, the United States challenged a
range of Chinese measures that established a state monopoly in the
provision of electronic payment services (EPS) for RMB payment
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card transactions.117 As the United States claimed, these measures
essentially required all EPS to be provided by a sole supplier – the
China Union Pay, Co. Ltd. (CUP), which was founded under the
approval of the State Council and the People’s Bank of China (PBC)
in 2002. The panel found that: (1) in its GATS schedule, China had
assumed the responsibility to grant all foreign financial institutions
the access to conducting RMB business without any limitations
other than prudential measures; (2) the EPS business in concern is a
type of RMB business; (3) China has failed to allow EPS suppliers
of other WTO Members to engage in the business; and therefore (4)
China has infringed its commitments relating to foreign investment
in its banking sector.118
Upon the adoption of the panel report China has been obliged to
remedy its violations, although China has negotiated with the
United States a reasonable period of time to do so, with the sides
ultimately agreeing on a deadline of July 31, 2013.119 However,
given the dominant role of the CUP and the Chinese government’s
support for such a monopoly, it remains uncertain as to whether the
government will take effective steps to actually allow access for
foreign EPS suppliers. Further, any action taken by the government
is unlikely to occur soon. In addition to the formal measures above,
the capacity of foreign banks to introduce new financial products
has still been limited by red tape.120 The dominant control of the big
four state banks over the RMB business has continued to
significantly restrain the capability of foreign banks to acquire
sufficient RMB deposits and consequently to conduct RMB
business.121
All in all, China’s selective liberalization of its banking sector for
FDI provides another illustration of its strategic implementation of
WTO obligations. China has not only been reluctant to eliminate
pre-WTO restrictions or conditions on FDI, but it has also created
117
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new entry barriers in this sector. When international obligations
conflict with domestic goals, China’s strategy has been to protect
domestic interests at the cost of foreign players without due regard
to its WTO obligations.

CHINA’S WTO COMMITMENTS
REFORMS UNDER THE FINANCE REGIME

AND

DOMESTIC

The final key elements of China’s economic transformation
have been its financial reforms and its integration into the
international financial system. However, compared to China’s trade
and investment regimes, the reform of its financial system has been
relatively slow and inadequate, lagging behind overall economic
reform and growth in China.122 At the forefront of contemporary
debates has been China’s exchange rate policy. Below, we discuss
this issue with a focus on China’s performance in the reforms of its
foreign exchange regime and its observance of relevant international
obligations.
China’s Foreign Exchange Regime
China’s exchange rate policy reform can be generally divided into
three phases: the pre-reform period (1949-1979), the reform period
(1979-2005), and the 2005 reform.123 Prior to China’s reform and
opening in 1979, the Chinese government had maintained rigid
controls over the value and convertibility of RMB with foreign
currencies. The RMB exchange rate was fixed at a considerable
overvalue (i.e. RMB 1.5 to a US dollar) for the purpose of
facilitating the importation of capital goods necessary for domestic
122
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industrial development. In order to maintain the value of the RMB,
the Chinese government introduced policies which restricted the
circulation and holding of foreign currencies within its territory,
required the deposit of foreign exchange earnings in the BOC and
strictly controlled the outflow of foreign capital. This excessive
RMB overvaluation severely constrained the exportation of
domestically-made goods and foreign investment into China.
The Chinese government has since gradually relaxed these
restrictions on foreign exchange and substantially devalued the
RMB. In 1979, the Chinese government introduced a scheme to
allow the retention of a certain portion of foreign exchange earnings
by exporters and local governments. Since 1985, Chinese residents
have been allowed to hold, deposit and withdraw foreign currencies,
subject to specified upper limits. In 1986, the Chinese government
approved the creation of foreign exchange markets, or swap centers,
for Chinese enterprises to conduct RMB and foreign exchange
trading under the supervision of the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE) and its predecessor. This was accompanied by
expanding the application of the foreign exchange retention scheme
to include all domestic entities, not just entities engaging in export.
Simultaneously, China introduced a duel-exchange rate regime,
under which an official exchange rate and a swap market rate
operated concurrently. This duel-exchange rate regime was
abolished in 1994 and “a unified managed floating exchange rate
regime based on market supply and demand” was instituted. 124
Under this new regime, the two rates were unified “by moving the
official rate to the then prevailing swap market rate” at around RMB
8.7 to a dollar.125 The foreign exchange retention scheme was then
replaced by an interbank system, under which the sale and purchase
of foreign exchange had to be conducted through authorized foreign
exchange banks. In 1996, the Chinese government removed
restrictions on foreign exchange for all transactions under the
current account involving trade in goods and services.
This basket of changes constituted major steps in reforming
China’s exchange rate policy from a centrally based system to a
market-based system. However, the Chinese government was far
124
125
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from prepared to adopt a fully floating exchange rate regime. Under
this ‘managed float’ regime, the nominal exchange rate of RMB was
pegged to the dollar at RMB 8.28 to a dollar, a rate that remained
almost unchanged until 2005. Furthermore, in contrast with the full
RMB convertibility under the current account, capital account
convertibility was yet to be liberalized except for inbound and
outbound FDI projects and a limited range of other transactions.126
In July 2005, the People’s Bank of China issued a policy
announcement to further adjust the exchange rate regime, moving
from a “de facto peg to the US dollar” to a system under which the
RMB is pegged to a basket of foreign currencies and is allowed to
“fluctuate by up to 0.3% (later changed to 0.5% in 2007 and 1% in
2012) on a daily basis against the basket.”127 The introduction of this
new system signaled the willingness of the Chinese government to
continue to move toward a more flexible market-based exchange
rate regime.128 Thanks to the operation of the system, the nominal
exchange rate of RMB appreciated by around 30% to RMB 6.35 to
a dollar by the end of 2011.129 Despite this further reform and the
appreciation of the RMB, the Chinese government has maintained a
“managed float” regime130 under which measures have been taken to
keep the RMB exchange rate stable. In order to offset upward
pressure on the RMB, the PBC has continued to purchase foreign
currency since 2001, which has led to massive accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves. 131 In the meantime, the Chinese
authorities have maintained stringent controls over the capital
account, inter alia, by subjecting foreign exchange inflows and
126
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outflows under the capital account to regulatory approvals and the
utilization of foreign capital remitted into China for regulatory
supervision.132
The Chinese government has been criticized for manipulating its
currency, frequently with reference to economic studies which
reveal that the RMB exchange rate has been significantly
undervalued and would have appreciated faster, and to a greater
extent, in the absence of the government interventions.133 Critics
allege that China’s currency regulation and the resultant
undervaluation of the RMB have created an unfair competitive
advantage for Chinese exports.134 However, the Chinese government
maintains that the purpose of its regulation is to “foster economic
stability through currency stability,” which is essential to China’s
economic development and growth.135 In response to the pressure on
RMB appreciation, the Chinese government has begun to reduce
value-added tax (VAT) rebates for exporters and has eliminated
rebates on many export products. 136 This indicates that the
“management” of the RMB exchange rate serves policy priorities
other than just providing financial support to exporters. One such
policy consideration concerns the vulnerability of China’s banking
system. China’s banking sector is still struggling with three key
challenges: (i) the non-performing loans of major commercial
banks,137 (ii) the low profitability of state-owned banks, and (iii) the
over reliance on household savings as a funding source.138 It has thus
132
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been observed that the stability of the RMB exchange rate is
essential to the stability, ongoing reform and growth of China’s
banking industry.139 Accordingly, it has been suggested that further
reforms of China’s exchange rate system need to go hand in hand
with “further strengthening of the banking system – and of the
financial system more broadly.”140 Without a strong banking system,
it is also advisable for China to keep the capital account relatively
closed so as to avoid capital flight and the insolvency of local banks
and firms that may result. 141 The perils of financial sector
liberalization preceding enhanced prudential regulation were well
established by the Asian economic crisis of 1997.142 The stability of
the RMB exchange rate has also been regarded as being essential to
stabilizing employment in the export sector and ensuring social
stability, both of which are fundamental to the further economic
growth of China. 143 China’s policy priority has shifted from
promoting exports to preventing social unrest and promoting
China’s overall economic growth by “managing” the pace of RMB
appreciation.
Opinions are divided as to whether the Chinese government’s
intervention in the foreign exchange markets has constituted a
breach of China’s international obligations under the International
Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and the WTO.144 As a member of the
IMF, China is obliged to comply with the rules set out in the IMF
Articles of Agreement145, including Article IV, which contains the
key obligations regarding exchange arrangements. According to
Article IV:2, a member is free to determine the exchange rate
regime that it intends to apply as long as this regime does not run
139
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counter to the member’s obligations under Article IV:1. Article
IV:1(iii) prohibits a member from “manipulating exchange rates or
the international monetary system in order to prevent effective
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive
advantage over other members” (emphasis added). Article IV:3
mandates the IMF to “oversee the compliance of each member with
its obligations under [Article IV:1].” In 2007, the executive board of
the IMF adopted an amended decision on “Bilateral Surveillance
over Members’ Policies”146 providing guidance for the exercise of
the oversight function of the Fund.
One guide, relating to the obligations under Article IV:1, provides
that the Fund shall consider and may initiate discussion with a
member who, among other things, is involved in “(i) protracted
large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market.”
Those who label China as a currency manipulator argue the Chinese
government’s long-lasting intervention in the foreign exchange
markets to resist RMB appreciation has constituted a violation of
Article IV:1(iii) of the IMF Agreement. 147 Other observers have
expressed the view that any challenge against China under Article
IV:1(iii) is unlikely to succeed because the embedded “intent”
element of that provision would be hard to establish – China’s
intervention may well serve policy objectives other than the
prevention of effective balance of payments adjustment or the
creation of an unfair trade advantage for Chinese exports. 148 As
discussed above, our analysis shows that the Chinese government
has been seeking to safeguard domestic financial and social
stabilities that are fundamental to China’s economic growth.
146
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Allegations of China’s violations of its IMF obligations, especially
under Article IV:1(iii), thus seem to be difficult to maintain. In
addition, China’s achievement of current account convertibility is
consistent with Article VIII:2(a) of the IMF Agreement, which
prohibits members from “impos[ing] restrictions on the making of
payments and transfers for current international transactions.” By
contrast, the Fund Agreement does not similarly prohibit members’
restrictions on capital account convertibility. China’s imposition of
capital account limitations is therefore not in breach of its
obligations under the Fund.149
Debates on the WTO-legality of China’s exchange rate policy
have mainly been based on Article XV:4 of the GATT and, more
frequently, the prohibition of export subsidies under the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement). GATT Article XV:4 prohibits WTO Members from
taking exchange actions which frustrate the intent of the GATT.
Despite allegations that China’s “management” of the RMB
exchange rate has infringed Article XV:4,150 many commentators
have observed that it is difficult to successfully challenge China’s
foreign exchange policy under Article XV:4.151 This is because the
legal obligations under Article XV:4 are too vague to be effectively
enforced in practice and are unlikely to be interpreted by the WTO
tribunals in such a way as to condemn China. The SCM Agreement
prohibits export subsidies, and whether China’s exchange regime
has amounted to such an export subsidy within the meaning of the
SCM Agreement is also controversial. According to Articles 1.1, 2,
and 3 of the SCM Agreement, for a measure to constitute an export
subsidy, the measure must: (1) be a governmental financial
contribution, (2) confer a benefit to a recipient, and (3) be specific
in the sense that it provides a subsidy to a specific industry or group
of industries. Presently, the subsidy must also be contingent on
export performance.
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Opinions are divided as to whether the Chinese government’s
intervention in the foreign exchange markets satisfies all three
conditions. 152 A significant number of leading analysts have
recognized the difficulties in establishing each of the criteria for the
WTO tribunals, in particular the requirement of specificity. Even if
the Chinese government was found to have financially assisted
Chinese exporters, its intervention would not be treated as an export
subsidy if the alleged financial support was not solely afforded to
Chinese exporters and the support was aimed at achieving
macroeconomic objectives other than export performance.153 In short,
it is unlikely that China’s “management” of the RMB exchange rate
has violated WTO rules under either the GATT Article XV:4 or the
SCM Agreement.
While there may not be enough evidence to prove a violation of
the WTO rules. China’s action still lead to another question.
Specifically, has China’s regulation of its exchange regime
constituted strategic implementation of its international obligations?
Compared to its trade and investment reforms, it is much less clear
whether China’s exchange policy reforms conflict with existing
multilateral rules. Certainly, the reforms in all three areas have
aimed to stimulate China’s transition to a market-based economy,
reform and develop domestic industries and strengthen the nation’s
overall economic growth. However, China has approached these
aims differently in each area. While reforming its trade and
investment regimes, China has deliberately ignored certain WTO
obligations that it considered to be inconsistent with the level of
development of certain sensitive industries, such as the automotive
industry, cultural industry and banking industry. By doing so, China
has strategically implemented its WTO commitments for its own
economic interests, at the cost of the interests of its trading partners.
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In contrast, China has endeavored to meet its multilateral
commitments in its foreign exchange reform. China has successfully
utilized its international obligations to facilitate domestic reforms
while at the same time exploiting “loopholes” or “grey areas” in
multilateral rules to manage the pace of reforms. For example, in
order to comply with Article VIII:2(a) of the IMF Agreement, China
has liberalized the current account by removing restrictions on RMB
convertibility for transactions involving trade in goods and services.
Accordingly, this liberalization is in China’s interest because it
coincides with its liberalization in trades of goods and services
pursuant to its commitments under the WTO. In retrospect, this
liberalization has played an important role in promoting exports,
bringing a desirable level of foreign competition, and stimulating
other aspects of economic reform and development in China.
Moreover, even though there are no IMF requirements for China to
liberalize the capital account, the Chinese government has allowed,
to different degrees, RMB convertibility in inward FDI projects and,
more recently, outward foreign investment transactions by Chinese
enterprises.154 This has significantly contributed to attracting FDI
and encouraging competent domestic enterprises to do business
overseas.
Finally, while the Chinese government has allowed steady
RMB appreciation in response to overwhelming pressure from the
international community (especially the United States), the
government seems to have taken a firm position that the progress of
exchange regime reform and the RMB exchange rate must be
regulated so as to avoid unwanted social and financial problems.
Considering the fragility of China’s financial system and various
other economic sectors, a step-by-step reform with reasonable
government regulation seems to be more socially and economically
sound than a fully-liberalized reform. Meanwhile, despite external
pressure from diplomatic channels, the Chinese government has
insisted that its intervention in the exchange regime is not in
contravention of any treaty obligations.
Even if China’s exchange regime was found to violate the IMF
Agreement or/and the WTO Agreement, it is likely that China
would continue to regulate its exchange regime in pursuit of
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domestic policy and economic goals. Since China has explicitly
engaged in selective implementation of WTO obligations in the
reform of its trade and investment regimes, it is reasonable to
anticipate that China would undertake a similar strategic approach
to reforms of its exchange regime, if required. It has been observed
that the IMF’s influence on China’s behavior and practice would be
quite limited even if China were found to be in breach of IMF rules,
due to the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and a lack of
leverage attributable to China not needing IMF financing.155 Under
the WTO, the most likely allegation is probably that by suppressing
the price of the RMB, the Chinese government has subsidized the
export sector in the form of (prohibited) export subsidies. However,
as discussed above,any attempted challenges against China on the
ground of currency subsidies would be difficult to substantiate. This
is partly why the United States Department of Commerce (USDOC)
has consistently refused to instigate petitions against China’s
currency subsidies.156 In addition, the USDOC is probably unwilling
to deal with this longstanding political hot potato. As Magnus and
Brightbill have observed,
Such an investigation would admittedly be dramatic,
and perhaps even traumatic. It would push Commerce
to the centre of the political spotlight concerning a
difficult international issue on which the Treasury
Department has led for many years. And merely
preparing, much less actually sending to the Chinese
Government, a CVD questionnaire aimed at eliciting
information that would be needed to make a “benefit”
determination on currency would create diplomatic
shockwaves.157
Thus, while the Chinese government has been under pressure to
allow the RMB to appreciate according to the demand and supply of
the market, China has also exerted considerable pressure on its
western counterparts, including the United States, to avoid
escalation of this issue to formal disputes or even trade wars. Given
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the firm stance of China and the stakes associated with keeping the
RMB stable, it is likely that the Chinese government will maintain
its controls over the foreign exchange markets regardless of legal
challenges, sanctions or retaliations from western countries either
taken unilaterally or under the WTO.

CONCLUSION
The rules of China’s engagement with the global trading system
were set by the West in the accession negotiations, and the West has
received enormous economic benefits from China’s rise. Despite
this, our initial research suggests that it is China who has most
skilfully navigated the rules governing its interaction with the rest of
the world, and implemented its international obligations so as to
protect its national agenda.
A full assessment would require a multi-year research project
and the results would fill at least one major volume. Short of such
an exercise, an appraisal such as this will be necessarily somewhat
subjective and partial. However, the snapshot we have taken
provides a useful starting point for evaluating who has best utilized
the international economic legal order. Our research suggests that
China has proven highly adept at furthering its national interests in
the application and implementation of, and strategic compliance
with, the rules governing the global economic system. While
reforming its trade and investment regimes, the Chinese government
has enforced the rules that have suited it and disregarded the
international obligations that have conflicted with its domestic goals.
Conversely, China’s financial reforms have mostly satisfied its
multilateral commitments but often very slowly and well after
compliance was due. The West, for its part, has pushed more softly
than it might have for full and strict compliance – despite having set
these rules.
There can be no doubting that, for a newcomer to the global
regulatory regime, China has proven exceptionally skilful at
bending or selectively ignoring the rules to favor itself.

